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KONDO-ING1 STEELE V. BULOVA:  
THE LANHAM ACT’S EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH VIA 
THE EFFECTS TEST 
 
MARGARET CHON* 
“Jurisdiction is a word of many, too many, meanings.”2 
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1 Ben Zimmer, Kondo-ing: A Guru of Organizing Becomes a Verb, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kondo-ing-a-guru-of-organizing-
becomes-a-verb-11547745648 (describing MARIE KONDO, THE LIFE-CHANGING MAGIC 
OF TIDYING UP (2014)). “Kondo-ing” is a neologism based on this recent best-seller 
and Netflix hit; it refers to “tidying up” while “keeping only those things that spark joy.” 
Kondo, WIKTIONARY, https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Kondo [https://perma.cc/FE28-
VZ8D] (last edited Feb. 21, 2019). 
 *  Many thanks to the participants in this symposium, including the editors of the 
Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law for extending the invitation, 
as well as to the participants of the Eighth International Intellectual Roundtable held 
at Florida State University College of Law for their support. I am indebted to Professor 
Tim Dornis for sharing his database on post-Steele cases and for his comments, to 
Associate Dean for Faculty Development Brooke Coleman, Professor Rochelle 
Dreyfuss, Professor Camilla Hrdy, Professor Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Professor Lisa 
Ramsey, Professor Marketa Trimble, and Professor Howard Wasserman for their 
insights, as well as to Professor Carys Craig for sharing her expert understanding of 
Canadian trademark law. Not least, thanks to Brian Ernst (class of 2020), Lauren 
Sewell (class of 2019), and reference librarian LeighAnne Thompson for their 
research support. Any errors are mine. 
2 Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 1952 Steele v. Bulova3 seems ripe for an update, a re-boot, or — 
in a (new) word: a kondo-ing. In the over sixty-five years since the 
Supreme Court decided the issue of the extraterritorial reach of the 
Lanham Act, the Court has shifted the procedural basis for 
extraterritoriality analysis. Furthermore, the various circuit court 
articulations of Steele’s so-called “effects test”4 have resulted in some 
doctrinal unruliness. And Congress has significantly amended the 
Lanham Act to include, among other new rights, anti-dilution. The recent 
decision in Trader Joe’s v. Hallatt shows why all of these developments 
have now come to a head.5 
Defendant Michael Hallatt’s “rebel Canadian grocery”6 — cheekily 
named Pirate Joe’s — served customers in the Vancouver, Canada area 
who were not able to shop at the plaintiff’s U.S.-based Trader Joe’s retail 
store located just across the border in Bellingham, Washington. Having 
lived in the U.S. for a time, Hallatt had become a connoisseur of Trader 
Joe’s often unusual food products.7 Doing business as Pirate Joe’s, 
 
3 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
4 Id. at 286 (“In the light of the broad jurisdictional grant in the Lanham Act, we 
deem its scope to encompass petitioner’s activities here. His operations and their 
effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a foreign nation.”). 
5 Trader Joe’s Co.  v. Hallatt (Hallatt II), 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016); Trader Joe’s 
Co. v. Hallatt (Hallatt I), 981 F.Supp.2d 972 (W.D. Wa. 2013). 
6 Amanda Holpuch, Rebel Canadian grocer Pirate Joe’s prepares for Trader Joe’s 
court battle, THE GUARDIAN (May 30, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/30/pirate-trader-joes-court-battle-
trademark-rights-canada [https://perma.cc/HCG5-7SFF]. 
7 Kevin Drews, Trader Joe’s Loses Lawsuit Against Michael Hallatt’s Pirate Joe’s, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/04/trader-
joes-loses-lawsuit-michael-hallatt-pirate-joes_n_4041755.html 
[https://perma.cc/B5CR-FVC5]. 
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Hallatt provided genuine Trader Joe’s items, which were sourced from 
authorized U.S. retail outlets, to underserved Canadian customers.8 
Hallatt believed that Trader Joe’s trademark rights were exhausted once 
these items were sold to him.9 His sales pitch did not disguise the fact 
that he was plying goods bearing trademarks belonging to Trader Joe’s.10 
Unlike most gray market goods,11 Pirate Joe’s sold these genuine 
products to Canadian customers at higher prices than they would be sold 
for in the U.S.12 Presumably, this mark-up reflected his customers’ 
willingness to purchase specialty food items, such as dark chocolate-
covered edamame from Trader Joe’s, without traveling across the 
border—a sometimes unpleasant and often challenging prospect post-
9/11.13 
Plaintiff Trader Joe’s was none too pleased with this across-the-border 
sale of its products. Despite the undisputed facts that Trader Joe’s did 
not sell goods in Canada, operate a retail store in Canada, or have 
Canadian trademark rights, it issued a cease and desist letter.14 It then 
sued Hallatt — a Canadian citizen (who had U.S. legal permanent 
resident status yet was apparently domiciled in Canada)—for violations 
of the federal Lanham Act and Washington state law15 in the U.S. District 
 
8 Holpuch, supra note 6. 
9 Drews, supra note 7. See also Christine Haight Farley, Territorial Exclusivity in 
U.S. Copyright and Trademark Law 59 (Am. U. Wash. Coll. of L., Paper No. 2014-
30), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443395 (“U.S. trademark law generally follows an 
international exhaustion regime with two exceptions. A national exhaustion rule for 
parallel imports exists in two categories: materially different goods and identical 
goods and marks manufactured abroad. In the first category, protection stems from 
whether there are differences between the foreign and domestic product. The 
difference need not be material; a court should consider any alteration in the product. 
In the second category, protection depends on whether a foreign importer has the 
same origins as the U.S. trademark holder. A relationship may permit parallel 
importation.”). 
10 Holpuch, supra note 6. 
11 Pirate Joe’s products were “so-called ‘gray goods,’ that is, trademarked goods 
manufactured abroad under a valid license but brought into [a] country in derogation 
of arrangements lawfully made by the trademark holder to ensure territorial 
exclusivity.” Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 
161, 166 (D.P.R. 1991). See also 19 C.F.R. § 133.23 (“Restrictions on importation of 
gray market articles”). Hallatt was purchasing authentic goods in the United States to 
re-sell them as ‘Canadian grey goods,’ which is not the typical gray market scenario 
considered by U.S. courts. 
12 Holpuch, supra note 6. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2016) (asserting the following claims: “(1) 
federal trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); (2) unfair competition, false 
endorsement, and false designation of origin, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); (3) false 
FINAL_CHON.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/19  11:34 PM 
104 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. [Vol. 25:2 
 
Court for the Western District of Washington.16 The district court granted 
Hallatt’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.17 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court, finding first that the district court erroneously decided the 
complaint on jurisdictional grounds under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP” or “Rule”) 12(b)(1), instead of considering the case on its merits 
as FRCP 12(b)(6) directs.18 The court of appeals then proceeded to 
consider the case under the so called “Timberlane” test — the Ninth 
Circuit-specific version of the more general effects test for analyzing 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.19 Both the court of appeals and the 
district court used substantially the same effects test on identical facts, 
but they reached opposite results on different procedural grounds. 
Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, the Ninth Circuit treated 
the allegations in the Trader Joe’s complaint as true, found them 
plausible, and decided that the complaint withstood dismissal on the 
merits. It concluded that the Timberlane test’s three factors favored 
extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.20 Notably, the court wrote: 
There is nothing implausible about the concern that Trader Joe’s will 
suffer a tarnished reputation and resultant monetary harm in the 
United States from contaminated goods sold in Canada. Incidents 
of food-born illness regularly make international news, and Trader 
Joe’s alleges that it is aware of at least one customer who became 
sick after consuming food sold by Pirate Joe’s. Courts have held that 
 
advertising, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B); (4) federal trademark dilution, 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c); (5) state trademark dilution, Wash. Rev. Code § 19.77.160; and (6) 
deceptive business practices in violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, 
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.020.”). 
16 Hallatt I, 981 F.Supp.2d 972, 972 (W.D. Wa. 2013). 
17 Id. at 974; see also Bill Chappell, Pirate Joe’s Celebrates Dismissal of Lawsuit, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 5, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2013/10/05/229537625/pirate-joes-celebrates-dismissal-of-trader-joes-lawsuit 
[https://perma.cc/CP3W-NJSH]. 
18 Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 968. 
19 Id. at 969. See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 
549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 1976). These Timberlane factors influenced sections 402 
and 403 of the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, which 
reflects this interest balancing approach. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-14. The 
Ninth Circuit incorporated these factors, enunciated in the context of the 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Antitrust Act, into its extraterritoriality 
analysis of the Lanham Act. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 
F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977). 
20 Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 975. 
FINAL_CHON.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/19  11:34 PM 
2019] KONDO-ING STEELE V. BULOVA 105 
 
reputational harm to an American plaintiff may constitute “some 
effect” on American commerce.21 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Hallatt’s potential exhaustion (sometimes 
referred to as “first sale”) defense,22 finding credible Trader Joe’s 
allegations regarding Pirate Joe’s (1) lack of quality control and (2) 
practice of charging higher prices for genuine Trader Joe’s products. 
Trader Joe’s argued successfully that these practices warranted an 
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion, which generally prevents a 
trademark owner from blocking the subsequent sale of a genuine good.23 
Despite Hallatt’s attempt at crowd-funding to meet his mounting legal 
fees,24 the litigation’s end was foretold as soon as Trader Joe’s complaint 
was allowed to proceed. Soon thereafter, the parties settled and Hallatt 
shuttered his business.25 Ironically, Trader Joe’s pending Canadian 
trademark applications issued soon after the litigation ended.26 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision was somewhat startling, even when 
judged against the relatively liberal extraterritorial application of the 
Lanham Act that it and other courts have employed.27 Notably, Trader 
Joe’s had not alleged that Hallatt sold confusingly similar products within 
the U.S., that any of his products somehow made their way back into the 
U.S., or that his company directed advertisements or other marketing into 
the U.S. Indeed, Pirate Joe’s business model was not one of confusing 
U.S. consumers, but rather one of courting Canadian consumers with 
 
21 Id. at 971. 
22 Haight Farley, supra note 9, at 59-60. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXHAUSTION AND PARALLEL IMPORTS 390 (Irene Calboli & 
Edward Lee eds., 2016). 
23 Transcript of Oral Argument, Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960, 970-972 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(No. 14-35035); Haight Farley, supra note 9, at 59-60. 
24 Holpuch, supra note 6. 
25 Christopher Mele, Pirate Joe’s, renegade reseller of Trader Joe’s products, 
shuts down, THE BELLINGHAM HERALD (June 12, 2017, 07:43 AM) 
https://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/local/article155178669.html 
[https://perma.cc/4FE3-EK9H]. Throughout the publicity around the case, Hallatt 
seemed to combine his rebel grocer instincts with those of a performance artist. For 
example, one photo of Hallatt’s storefront shows the “P” deliberately missing from 
“Pirate” so as to spell “irate Joe’s.” See Holpuch, supra note 6. 
26 TRADER JOE’S, Registration No. TMA 958/215 (Can.); TRADER JOE’S 
Design, Registration No. TMA 958/214 (Can.). 
27 Holpuch, supra note 6 (quoting Christine Farley stating: “Just opening the door 
to trademark owners to sue in the US courts for acts that occurred abroad and to be 
able to survive a motion to dismiss is huge.”). See also William C. Johnston, 
Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act Saves an American Brand from a 
Canadian Retail Pirate, 40 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 165, 166 (2017); Recent 
Cases, Foreign Relations Law—Lanham Act Extraterritoriality—Ninth Circuit Applies 
Lanham Act to Wholly Foreign Sales, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1946, 1946 (2017). 
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genuine Trader Joe’s products purchased from an authorized U.S. retail 
source. Yet, despite no evidence that these re-sold goods had made their 
way back into the U.S., the court managed to find that they had a 
sufficient “effect” on U.S. commerce to state a claim for relief. 
In so finding, the court relied on the landmark Steele v. Bulova case.28 
Its analysis of that case, however, arguably extended extraterritoriality 
well beyond the facts in Steele. The Steele defendant (a U.S. citizen) had 
sold counterfeit watches in Mexico, where he had no rights to the 
authentic manufacturer’s mark, and where that manufacturer’s U.S. 
advertising had reached.29 Further, some of the defendant’s 
extraterritorial sales were to U.S. citizens, who might have transported 
the watches back to the U.S.30 In Trader Joe’s, by contrast, the litigation 
involved a Canadian defendant who sold not counterfeit but rather 
genuine goods, as well as undisputed facts showing that the authentic 
manufacturer conducted no advertising or sales in Canada. Nor did the 
plaintiff allege that any of these re-sold goods had made their way back 
into the U.S. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s extraterritoriality analysis 
functioned as a strong proxy for a weakly supported anti-dilution claim 
with no definitive evidence of reputational harm in the U.S., and without 
full consideration of any available defenses, statutory31 or otherwise. 
The federal circuit courts have developed different standards for 
determining whether commercial activity is sufficient to warrant 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law — i.e., the “effects test.” For 
instance, the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have stated that the 
effect on U.S. commerce must be “substantial” before U.S. law will reach 
extraterritorially.32 The First, Third, and Fourth Circuits instead require a  
“significant effect.”33 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have framed the post-
 
28 Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 970-72 (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch, 344 U.S. 280, 286 
(1952)). 
29 See id.; see also GRAEME AUSTIN, The Story of Steele v. Bulova: Trademarks on 
the Line, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 395, 400, 411 (Jane Ginsburg & Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). 
30 AUSTIN, supra note 29, at 401. 
31 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012) (listing statutory defenses to anti-dilution). 
32 Int’l Cafe, S.A.L., v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 
(11th Cir. 2001) (finding no “substantial effect” on United States commerce); Liberty 
Toy Co. v. Fred Silber Co., No. 97-3177, 1998 WL 385469, at *6 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(remanding for application of “substantial effects” test); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton 
Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) (adopting test requiring “substantial effect” on 
United States commerce). 
33 McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting test 
requiring “significant effect” on United States commerce); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. 
Aeropower Co. Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring “significant effect” 
on United States commerce). See also Scanvec Amiable Ltd. v. Chang, 80 F. App’x 
FINAL_CHON.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/19  11:34 PM 
2019] KONDO-ING STEELE V. BULOVA 107 
 
Steele test as one that only requires “some effect.”34 Whether the effect 
on U.S. commerce must be substantial, significant, or just “some” (as in 
Trader Joe’s), an overly-generous application of this test — combined 
with an impoverished conception of the exhaustion rule — threatens the 
business models of, among others, giant warehouse seller Costco,35 as 
well as the more distributed but proliferating third party sellers 
frequenting on-line platforms such as Amazon, eBay, Etsy, and the like. 
Curbing the first sale doctrine based on sparse evidence of “effect” — 
such as potential reputational damage — will disrupt these on-going 
global commercial activities in plying gray market or other legitimate re-
sold goods. 
Less noticed than the arguable mischief to the first sale doctrine 
caused by the expansive reach of its effects test, the Ninth Circuit also 
broke with all other circuits in its procedural ruling. It created a new and 
different circuit split by refusing to treat the test of the Lanham Act’s 
extraterritoriality as one of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling instead that 
this issue be treated on the merits. In doing so, however, it failed to 
explicitly distinguish the controlling precedent, i.e., Steele. Instead, the 
Trader Joe’s court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 
2006 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. case,36 as well as its 2010 Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank case,37 finding that these more recent cases 
superseded any previous Ninth Circuit decision considering this issue on 
subject matter jurisdiction grounds. Yet neither the Ninth Circuit in Trader 
Joe’s,38 nor the Supreme Court in Arbaugh or Morrison, directly 
addressed or refuted the language in Steele with regard to subject matter 
 
171, 181 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopting a variant satisfied by either significant or substantial 
effect). 
34 Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(finding subject matter jurisdiction given “some effect” on United States commerce); 
Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(requiring “some effect” on United States commerce); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells 
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977) (adopting the Timberlane 
“some effects” rule of reason in the context of the Lanham Act). 
35 See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2008), 
aff’d, 562 U.S. 40 (2010). 
36 546 U.S. 500 (2006).   
37 Morrison v.  Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).   
38 VED P. NANDA ET AL., LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 8:26 
(2018) (“The Ninth Circuit, at least on occasion, barely refers to the Bulova factors, 
relying instead on a longer list of factors set forth in the first Timberlane Lumber Co. 
v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A. decision. Timberlane I set forth a fairly complex 
balancing test applicable to antitrust jurisdiction. Ninth Circuit (and other) decisions 
often rely on Timberlane in assessing jurisdiction under the Lanham Act.”). 
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jurisdiction.39 Certainly, nothing in Arbaugh indicates that it intended to 
overrule Steele sub silentio on this issue, although it is possible to 
interpret Morrison as doing so.40 Regardless, the Ninth Circuit now 
stands alone among all circuits in treating this issue as one on the 
merits.41 
Thus, the Trader Joe’s ruling brings to light previously submerged42 
and unresolved questions that have developed in the wake of Steele. 
Decisions in other areas of intellectual property law reveal the same 
judicial inconsistency with respect to the threshold issue of whether to 
treat the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law as a jurisdiction or merits 
question.43 The extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws is a species of the more 
 
39 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. at 281 n.2 (1998) (“While the record 
shows that plaintiff fully relied on his asserted cause of action ‘arising under’ the 
Lanham Act, diversity of citizenship and the jurisdictional amount were also averred. 
As we are concerned solely with the District Court’s jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of this suit, we do not stop to consider the significance, if any, of those 
averments.”); see also id. at 286 (“In the light of the broad jurisdictional grant in the 
Lanham Act, we deem its scope to encompass petitioner’s activities here. His 
operations and their effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a foreign 
nation.”). 
40 Morrison referred to Steele parenthetically, stating in a footnote: “although a 
final case cited by the Solicitor General, . . . [Steele] might be read to permit 
application of a nonextraterritorial statute whenever conduct in the United States 
contributes to a violation abroad, we have since read it as interpreting the statute at 
issue—the Lanham Act—to have extraterritorial effect.” Morrison, 561 U.S. at 272 
n.11 (2010) (internal citations omitted). 
41 Relying on the Trader Joe’s district court decision, this issue was characterized 
as one of subject matter jurisdiction. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:58 (5th ed. 2017). 
42 Elizabeth McCuskey uses “submerged” in conjunction with the unexamined 
precedential consequences of unreported decisions that may have more detailed 
reasoning as well as different outcomes from published decisions. Elizabeth Y. 
McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 Nev. L.J. 515, 516 (2016). While McCuskey’s 
use of the term serves an important purpose, this article uses the term “submerged” 
in a different sense: to denote legal issues that have been allowed to proliferate in 
their original form as having precedential value despite the waning quality or 
relevance of that value. 
43 For a discussion of the subject matter jurisdiction versus merits confusion in 
copyright and patent cases see Marketa Trimble, The Territorial Discrepancy 
between Intellectual Property Rights Infringement Claims and Remedies, 23 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 20 n.93) (on file with the Boston 
University Journal of Science & Technology Law) (citing Geophysical Service, Inc. v. 
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Copyright 
Act’s insistence that infringing conduct be domestic offers an essential element of a 
copyright infringement plaintiff’s claim, not of jurisdiction . . . . [B]ounding the reach 
of the Copyright Act to territorial conduct presents a question of the merits of the 
claim, not the jurisdiction of the court.”). Id. (citing to Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light 
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general genus of jurisdiction, sometimes characterized as prescriptive 
jurisdiction44 and/or prescriptive comity.45 Prescriptive jurisdiction 
involves the authority of the state (typically a legislative authority, such 
as Congress in the U.S.) to make its law applicable to persons or 
activities.46 Relatedly, prescriptive comity involves deference by the state 
to foreign lawmakers.47 The intertwining of procedural and substantive 
 
Products, Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (“[W]hether the allegedly 
infringing act happened in the United States is an element of the claim for patent 
infringement, not a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction.”). Cf. Peter Starr Prod. 
Co. v. Twin Cont’l Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986) (treating extraterritorial 
application of the U.S. Copyright Act as a subject matter jurisdiction issue). 
44 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. a (2018) 
(“Jurisdiction to prescribe, also called prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction, concerns 
the authority of a state to make law applicable to persons, property, or conduct.”). 
Furthermore, Section 402 states: 
(1) Subject to the constitutional limits set forth in § 403, the United States 
exercises jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to: 
(a) persons, property, and conduct within its territory; 
(b) conduct that has a substantial effect within its territory; 
(c) the conduct, interests, status, and relations of its nationals and residents 
outside its territory; [and] 
(d) certain conduct outside its territory that harms its nationals. 
Id. (emphasis added). See also Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257 (characterizing 
extraterritorial inquiry as one of prescriptive jurisdiction). 
45 “In exercising jurisdiction to prescribe, the United States takes account of the 
legitimate interests of other nations as a matter of prescriptive comity.” RESTATEMENT 
(FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (2018) (emphasis added). 
46 Howard Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the 
Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 287, 298 (2012) 
(“Prescriptive jurisdiction is the power of secular rulemakers to prescribe legal rules 
and to regulate real-world behavior. It can be understood under any of our definitions: 
as the power to assert regulatory authority over some actors and to prohibit or 
regulate some conduct; as the power to establish Hohfeldian rights and duties; or as 
the power to determine who can sue whom for what primary conduct. The most 
common wielder of prescriptive jurisdiction is the legislature, which bears primary 
responsibility for establishing prospective legal rules of general applicability to real-
world behavior.”); see also P. Sean Morris, From Territorial to Universal: The 
Extraterritoriality of Trademark Law and the Privatizing of International Law, 37 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 33, 58 (2019) (attributing the trifurcation of adjudicative, 
prescriptive, and enforcement jurisdiction to FREDERICK MANN, THE DOCTRINE OF 
JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964)). 
47 William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
2071, 2078 (2015) (characterizing deference to foreign lawmakers as prescriptive 
comity); accord Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 NYU L. REV. 
390, 392 (2017) (“Prescriptive comity doctrines manage the overlap in states’ power 
to establish laws and regulate behavior, while adjudicative comity doctrines speak to 
which sovereign should resolve a particular dispute.”). 
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questions, while evident in many other areas of law, seems particularly 
acute here. 
The courts, including the Supreme Court, seem to indicate that the test 
of extraterritoriality is identical, whether applied as a jurisdictional test or 
applied as on the merits.48 This may or may not be true. As discussed in 
more detail below, the procedural vehicles for these respective 
dismissals — FRCP 12(b)(1) versus FRCP 12(b)(6) — have significantly 
different strategic consequences, including the opportunity to raise 
defenses at an early stage of litigation. If the issue of prescriptive 
jurisdiction/comity is indeed more one of merits and less of jurisdiction 
(despite the term “jurisdiction”), then it is time for the Supreme Court to 
“kondo” Steele — ridding it of its excess subject matter jurisdictional 
baggage and thereby signaling its endorsement of the Trader Joe’s 
court’s merits-based approach to this question. This would not 
necessarily require an overruling of Steele but rather a revisit to it, 
particularly in light of recent cases emphasizing the importance of well-
supported jurisdictional classifications. 
Beyond conceptual and theoretical tidiness regarding the jurisdictional 
classification, courts also arguably require more guidance regarding 
whether harm to trademark goodwill is sufficiently different from other 
kinds of commercial harm to justify the generous extension of 
extraterritoriality under the Lanham Act via the effects test. Increasingly, 
courts seem to rely on activities that impact any aspect of the plaintiffs’ 
goodwill, even (as in Trader Joe’s) those conducted wholly outside the 
U.S. and resulting in reputational harm only.49 This broad ambit may 
make sense in the context of a global market of transnational goodwill 
that crosses borders with the click of a mouse,50 or in the specific factual 
setting of Trader Joe’s, which involved perishable food products.51 
 
48 See, e.g., Morrison v.  Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Arbaugh v. 
Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
49 Courts even find harm completely unrelated to the information economics of 
trademark law “such as loaning funds or transacting bank business in the United 
States (7 opinions (4.4%)) [or] the financial gain of a US entity (i.e., defendant) 
received from abroad (5 opinions (3.14%)).” Tim W. Dornis, Behind the Steele 
Curtain: An Empirical Study of Trademark Conflicts Law, 1952-2016, 20 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 567, 630 (2018). See also, e.g., Paulsson, 529 F.3d at 307 (finding subject 
matter jurisdiction given “some effect” on United States commerce); Am. Rice, 701 
F.2d at 414 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); Wells Fargo, 556 at 406 (adopting Timberlane 
“some effects” rule of reason in the context of the Lanham Act). 
50 See generally Graeme W. Austin, The Consumer in Cross-Border Passing Off 
Cases, 47 VICT. U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 209 (2016); Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The 
Digital Trademark Right: A Troubling New Extraterritorial Reach of United States 
Law, 81 N.C.L. REV. 483 (2003). 
51 Jack Houston, A psychologist explains how Trader Joe’s gets you to spend 
more money, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/trader-
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Nonetheless, the canard that trademark law is territorial52 is undermined 
by notions of domestic effects that rely heavily on broad notions of 
reputation-based harm rather than harm caused by consumer confusion.  
The Ninth Circuit assumed, for example, that an American business was 
harmed by what some left-coast Canadians might think about its 
products after purchasing them from a store that was indisputably a 
purveyor of resold goods. And this interpretation of “effects” flies in the 
face of recent Supreme Court caselaw (albeit in the context of federal 
securities rather than trademark law) rejecting a broad view of “effects.”53 
The jurisdictional and merits aspects of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling are 
inextricably fused. As previously noted, its approach to the extraterritorial 
reach of U.S. law, whether on procedural or substantive grounds, is 
arguably an outlier.54 This matters for both principled and strategic 
reasons. From the perspective of legal principle, the circuit split created 
by the Trader Joe’s decision suggests that correctly characterizing and 
clarifying prescriptive jurisdiction will matter for many types of cases, not 
just Lanham Act-based cases. From a strategic standpoint, the Ninth 
Circuit has surpassed the Second Circuit as the most popular circuit for 
filing extraterritorial Lanham Act actions. It also currently has a higher 
extraterritoriality rate than the Second Circuit.55 To the extent that the 
Trader Joe’s decision signals friendliness towards plaintiffs, it may 
increase the incentive to forum-shop westward in Lanham Act cases, 
 
joes-how-gets-you-spend-money-psychologist-2019-1 [https://perma.cc/L34S-TF26] 
(“In short, they’re there to make your life easier. This ideology is embodied in their 
food as well as specifically their frozen food. And Americans have always had a 
certain affection for a heat-and-serve mentality. Frozen dinners are easy, fast, and 
little mess.”). 
52 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law 
From the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 887 (2004). 
53 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 258-59 (stating “[t]here is no more damning indictment of 
the . . . ‘effects’ tests than the Second Circuit’s own declaration that ‘the presence or 
absence of any single factor which was considered significant in other cases . . . is 
not necessarily dispositive in future cases.’”). 
54 See generally Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th 
Cir. 1977). 
55 Dornis, supra note 49, at 601 (“Regarding the number of newly filed cases, the 
Ninth Circuit actually took the lead from the Second Circuit in 2007.”). Moreover: 
[T]he Second Circuit is far from being the spearhead of extraterritoriality. While 
that circuit remains the champion with regard to case numbers, its 
extraterritoriality rate (48.84%) is below the overall average of 60.67%. This 
number is particularly dramatic when compared with the Fifth Circuit, which 
applied the Lanham Act extraterritorially in almost all of the opinions decided 
there—12 out of 13 opinions, or 92.31%. In addition—and quite contrary to 
conventional wisdom—the Ninth Circuit fails to meet its reputation as a rights 
holder’s haven. Of course, its overall extraterritoriality rate is 65.85%. 
Id. at 599. 
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thus exacerbating the trend toward generous helpings of 
extraterritoriality. 
These important concerns are part of a larger debate about the 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. intellectual property laws, including its 
trademark laws.56 The remainder of this Article addresses these issues 
as follows: Part I examines the possible bases for viewing the Lanham 
Act’s extraterritorial reach as either a jurisdictional or a merits issue. It 
briefly contrasts the doctrinal and strategic differences between a 
dismissal based upon subject matter jurisdiction and one on the merits 
while considering empirical data regarding published judicial decisions 
on these motions,57 to explore what courts (post-Steele and pre-Trader 
Joes) have been deciding “in action” as opposed to “in books.”58 Part II 
then examines the Supreme Court’s general framework for 
extraterritoriality analysis and explores how this question is currently 
handled in the specific context of the Lanham Act. Further, it critically 
examines how the Trader Joe’s court applied the effects test. Finally, it 
links the previous sections to normative trademark policy, particularly the 
scope of the exhaustion doctrine in the face of the expanding rights of 
trademark owners. 
At its core, Steele held that the Lanham Act has extraterritorial reach; 
this holding has been followed faithfully by lower courts.59 While the 
Supreme Court has been active lately in modernizing the federal 
common law of extraterritoriality, it has not updated the reach of the 
Lanham Act. Thus, it is timely to consider whether the Supreme Court 
should “kondo” the iconic Steele v. Bulova decision, ridding it of 
unnecessary doctrinal clutter and allowing the development of 
extraterritoriality doctrine in trademark law to proceed with greater clarity, 
if not with joy.60 
 
56 See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age 
of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997); Roger E. Schechter, The Case for Limited 
Extraterritorial Reach of the Lanham Act, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 619 (1997); Dinwoodie, 
supra note 52. 
57 See generally Dornis, supra note 49 (coding all post-Steele cases deciding 
extraterritoriality between 1952 and 2016). 
58 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 12 (1910); 
Bill Clune, Law in Action and Law on the Books: A Primer, NEW LEGAL REALISM: 
EMPIRICAL L. & SOC’Y (June 12, 2013), http://newlegalrealism.org/2013/06/12/law-in-
action-and-law-on-the-books-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/59Y6-2T5R]. 
59 Dornis, supra note 49, at 571. The Dornis database reflects “133 actual disputes 
(until 2016)—with 159 database-accessible opinions (not necessarily published in the 
reporters)—i.e., some ‘disputes’ ended up with decisions of the majority, and a 
concurring or a dissenting opinion.” E-mail from Professor Tim Dornis to author (Mar. 
5, 2019) (on file with author). 
60 Kondo, supra note 1. 
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1. JURISDICTION OR MERITS? THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE 
LANHAM ACT 
A. Parsing Jurisdiction: Laws in Books 
The Supreme Court is re-visiting some of its earlier jurisdictional 
rulings with a critical eye. For example, in Arbaugh, a unanimous 
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Ginsburg, stated: 
On the subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim for-relief 
dichotomy, this Court and others have been less than meticulous. 
Subject matter jurisdiction in federal question cases is sometimes 
erroneously conflated with a plaintiff’s need and ability to prove the 
defendant bound by the federal law asserted as the predicate for 
relief—a merits-related determination.61 
Arbaugh is part of a discernable project by the Court to clean up its 
jurisprudence of jurisdiction, and to refuse to give precedent to “drive-by 
jurisdictional rulings.”62 Its specific concern was whether Title VII’s 
numerosity requirement is an element of a claim based on Congressional 
power to regulate commerce. Many courts had treated this as a question 
of subject matter jurisdiction, but the Court clarified that it is a merits 
issue.63 
While Arbaugh did not involve extraterritorial application of a federal 
statute, the subsequent Morrison case involved the extraterritorial reach 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. In language that the Ninth 
Circuit quoted in Trader Joe’s, the Morrison Court stated: 
But to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 
10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter 
jurisdiction, by contrast, “refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.” 
. . . It presents an issue quite separate from the question whether 
the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief.”64 
 
61 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 n.10 (2006). (“A claim invoking 
federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . may be dismissed for want 
of subject matter jurisdiction if it is not colorable, i.e., if it is “immaterial and made 
solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or is “wholly insubstantial and 
frivolous.” . . . Arbaugh’s case surely does not belong in that category.”). 
62 Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)) (“The 
short of the matter is that the jurisdictional character of the elements of the cause of 
action . . . made no substantive difference (nor even any procedural difference that 
the Court seemed aware of), had been assumed by the parties, and was assumed 
without discussion by the Court. We have often said that drive-by jurisdictional rulings 
of this sort . . . have no precedential effect.”). See also Wasserman, supra note 46, 
at 308, n.107 (listing relevant cases). 
63 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 512. 
64 Morrison v.  Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010). 
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Both Arbaugh and Morrison are fairly sparsely reasoned with regard to 
the grounds for classifying an issue as a merits question rather than a 
procedural one. Nonetheless, they both point strongly to the position that 
the Trader Joe’s court eventually took. 
More distantly, the Supreme Court had re-affirmed the extraterritorial 
reach of the Lanham Act  in the Aramco case, which rejected the 
extraterritorial application of Title VII, but (in dicta) distinguished Steele 
as marking a “broad jurisdictional grant” including “commerce with 
foreign nations.”65 And most recently, the Court stated a test of 
extraterritoriality in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community: 
First, the Court asks whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has been rebutted—i.e., whether the statute gives 
a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. This 
question is asked regardless of whether the particular statute 
regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction.66 
Thus the earlier Aramco opinion’s affirmation of Steele is couched in 
fuzzy jurisdictional language later criticized in Arbaugh67 and without the 
“clear, affirmative indication” required by RJR Nabisco.68 
These and other cases indicate that the analysis of prescriptive 
jurisdiction is the very opposite of trans-substantive.69 The question 
 
65  EEOC v. Arab-American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 252 (1991) (“The 
[Lanham] Act defined commerce as ‘all commerce which may lawfully be regulated 
by Congress.’ The stated intent of the statute was ‘to regulate commerce within the 
control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks 
in such commerce.’ While recognizing that ‘the legislation of Congress will not extend 
beyond the boundaries of the United States unless a contrary legislative intent 
appears,’ the Court concluded that in light of the fact that the allegedly unlawful 
conduct had some effects within the United States, coupled with the Act’s ‘broad 
jurisdictional grant’ and its sweeping reach into ‘all commerce which may lawfully be 
regulated by Congress,’ the statute was properly interpreted as applying abroad.”) 
(citations omitted). 
66 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2093-94 (2016) (emphasis added). 
67 Indeed, the Arbaugh court critiqued its 1991 decision in Aramco, 499 U.S. 244— 
a Title VII case involving extraterritorial application of laws — as having engaged in 
an unthinkingly automatic subject matter jurisdiction classification. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 
at 512 (describing that the Aramco “judgment had been placed under a lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction label. We agreed with the lower courts’ view of the limited 
geographical reach of the statute. En passant, we copied the petitioners’ 
characterizations of terms included in Title VII’s “Definitions” section as 
“jurisdictional.” But our decision did not turn on that characterization.”) (citations 
omitted). 
68 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2094. 
69 See David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 
2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1203-07 (2013) (categorizing different degrees of substance-
specific versus trans-substantive laws). 
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whether a statute ought to have extraterritorial reach is highly dependent 
on the precise statutory language at hand, Congressional intent, and 
other factors.70 Relatedly, the question whether extraterritoriality is a 
subject matter jurisdiction issue in any particular statutory context may 
also depend on the specific statutory language from which this question 
is presented. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg in Arbaugh suggested the 
Congress had the power to turn what the Court deemed to be a merits 
issue into a jurisdictional one, by enacting appropriate jurisdictional 
statutes.71 And the Lanham Act contains a specific jurisdictional 
provision72 that complicates any attempt to apply non-Lanham Act 
precedents to it. 
As a result of this statute-specificity, the Arbaugh and Morrison 
analyses arguably cannot necessarily be applied across the board to all 
commerce clause-based statutes. And if this is so, then what principled 
basis exists for delineating subject matter jurisdiction from merits 
questions more generally? Howard Wasserman has recently argued that 
courts often confuse prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction and 
adjudicative (or judicial) jurisdiction. As stated earlier, prescriptive 
jurisdiction involves the authority of Congress to make its law applicable 
to persons or activities.73 For example, according to the Restatement 
 
70 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 133-134 (2013); Morrison 
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 256-58 (2010); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 
550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007); RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2095, 2110, 2114. See 
generally Rochelle Dreyfuss & Linda Silberman, Misappropriation on a Global Scale: 
Extraterritoriality and Applicable Law in Transborder Trade Secrecy Cases, 8 
CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 265, 291-295 (2017) (discussing recent development 
in extraterritorial reach of different types of intellectual property laws). 
71 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S., 514-15 (2006). Of course, Congress could 
make the employee-numerosity requirement “jurisdictional,” just as it has made an 
amount-in-controversy threshold an ingredient of subject matter jurisdiction in 
delineating diversity-of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See also 
Layne E. Kruse & Rebecca H. Benavides, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Federal 
Court in International Cases, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: DEFENDING AND SUING 
FOREIGN PARTIES IN THE U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 136 (David J. Levy ed., 2003) (“Federal 
statutes may create original federal jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction in 
international dispute by virtue of a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The grant 
of ‘arising under’ jurisdiction in Article III, § 2 of the Constitution is not self-
executing.”). 
72 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1998). 
73 Wasserman, supra note 46, at 298-299. But see Dodge, supra note 47, at 2100 
(“Prescriptive comity is comity to lawmakers—often legislatures, but sometimes 
courts or executive branch officials. Furthermore, prescriptive comity is exercised by 
courts. It is true that courts sometimes justify the extension of comity through 
assumptions about what the legislature would want. It is also true that legislatures 
sometimes speak directly to the recognition of foreign law or the extraterritorial reach 
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(Fourth) of Foreign Relations,74 extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction 
can be exercised when there are “substantial, direct, and foreseeable 
effect upon . . . U.S. commerce”75 — an articulation of the effects test that 
will be revisited in Part II.   
The question of the Congressional authority and intent to exercise 
prescriptive jurisdiction is at the very core of an extraterritoriality analysis, 
in which courts must consider whether the legislature intended the reach 
of a federal statute to regulate the conduct of persons beyond the 
borders. According to Wasserman, this is a type of merits analysis that 
goes to the scope of legislative power.76 Adjudicative jurisdiction, by 
contrast, involves the judiciary’s “root power to adjudicate [a case]: to 
hear and resolve legal and factual issues under substantive legal rules, 
and to provide the adjudicative and remedial forum to resolve claims of 
right.”77 In his view, the conceptual difference between prescriptive and 
adjudicative jurisdiction provides the principled ground to differentiate 
between a merits inquiry and a subject matter jurisdictional one. 
In light of Arbaugh and Morrison, the key question is whether Steele 
decided a question of prescriptive jurisdiction on the merits regarding 
congressional authority to regulate extraterritorial conduct pursuant to 
use “in commerce” or whether it was engaging in adjudicative jurisdiction 
regarding the reach of its original jurisdiction. The Steele Court did not 
 
of domestic law. But it is ultimately courts that interpret and apply these rules, 
sometimes relying on background principles of ‘prescriptive comity’ to do so.”). 
74 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (2018). 
75 Id. (“Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable 
is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate . . . the 
link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the 
activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable 
effect upon or in the territory.”). 
76 Wasserman, supra note 46, at 310 (“[T]he [Morrison] Court characterized 
limitations on the scope and reach of the legal rule as merits-based simply because 
what a legal rule prohibits and who it controls is, by its nature, a merits issue.”). See 
also, John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2513, 2515 (1998) (“Congress with its substantive powers 
can create, decline to create, or limit causes of action. It can determine who is entitled 
to sue whom, for what, and for what remedy.”). 
77 Wasserman, supra note 46, at 302-03. According to Wasserman, the on-going 
confusion about the all-purpose word “jurisdiction” is due to a conflation between the 
jurisdictional elements needed to prove a claim and judicial jurisdiction: “Jurisdictional 
elements are about congressional jurisdiction—substantive congressional 
constitutional power or authority—to regulate particular real-world conduct through 
legislation. Jurisdictional elements have nothing to do with judicial jurisdiction—
judicial power or authority—to adjudicate a case or controversy between parties 
under that statute.” Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 
643, 684 (2005). 
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use either of these terms, but it did frame the question presented this 
way: 
The issue is whether a United States District Court has jurisdiction 
to award relief to an American corporation against acts of trade-mark 
infringement and unfair competition consummated in a foreign 
country by a citizen and resident of the United States 
Resolution of the jurisdictional issue in this case therefore depends 
on construction of exercised congressional power, not the limitations 
upon that power itself. And since we do not pass on the merits of 
Bulova’s claim, we need not now explore every facet of this complex 
and controversial Act.78   
The Court’s language in this part of the opinion is strongly suggestive 
of prescriptive rather than adjudicative jurisdiction, whereby the Court is 
evaluating the proper reach of Congressional power—as opposed to the 
limits imposed on the federal judicial power authorized by Congress. It 
thus indicates that the Court was actually engaging in a merits analysis, 
i.e., analyzing prescriptive jurisdiction, despite language in the opinion 
that refers to many different types of jurisdiction.79 
The Steele Court undeniably cited extensively to federal statutes 
governing original jurisdiction of the federal courts, such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331,80 1332,81 and 1338,82 as well as to the Lanham Act’s specific 
jurisdictional provision, which echoes the “arising under” language of 
Sections 1331 and 1338.83 Furthermore, extraterritoriality analysis 
 
78 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280, 281-283 (1952). However, 
neither of the appellate briefs characterized the issue as one of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
79 The Steele Court wrote “[t]he Lanham Act, on which Bulova posited its claims 
to relief, confers broad jurisdictional powers upon the courts of the United States. The 
statute’s expressed intent is. . . .” then it proceeded to lay out the purpose of the 
statute, the scope of the cause of action, the grant of jurisdiction to claims “arising 
under” and the available remedies. Id. at 283-284. 
80 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”) 
(emphasis added). 
81 There was diversity between the parties as the plaintiff Bulova company was a 
citizen of New York and defendants Steele and his wife were U.S. citizens, as well 
as citizens of the state of Texas. Steele, 344 U.S. at 281. 
82 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a 
substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection or 
trademark laws”) (emphasis added). 
83 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012) (“The district and territorial courts of the United States 
shall have original jurisdiction  . . . of all actions arising under this chapter, without 
regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship 
of the parties.”). 
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necessarily involves statutory interpretation of the “laws” of the United 
States, including the Lanham Act, as well as federal common law 
(including customary international law, conflicts of law, and comity).84 
These various citations suggest that the Steele Court may have 
perceived the question presented as whether a colorable federal 
question existed as a basis for original jurisdiction of the district court. 
However, virtually all commentators agree that the crux of the Steele 
Court’s analysis is section 45 of the Lanham Act, specifically, the Court’s 
reading of Congressional intent “to regulate commerce within the control 
of Congress” in tandem with the statutory definition of commerce as “all 
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”85  The Court’s 
heavy reliance on these sections of the statute in its Steele opinion 
resembles more of the modern take on the prescriptive jurisdiction of 
Congress in the area of foreign relations86 rather than the traditional 
subject matter jurisdiction analysis, which is primarily concerned with 
channeling cases between federal and state judicial systems in a 
domestic context.87 
Furthermore, most modern “arising under” tests involve some 
balancing of federal and state interests, based upon federalism 
concerns,88 yet federalism-related balancing is absent from the various 
tests for extraterritoriality. Federalism supplies the general rationale for 
the channeling function of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to FRCP 
12(b)(1): Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction under Article III 
of the Constitution, with power to hear specifically defined categories of 
cases, such as cases “arising under the Constitution, treaties, and laws 
of the United States.”89 Conversely, state courts are courts of general 
jurisdiction with the power and authority to hear any kind of case. A 
plaintiff does not have a right to be in federal court for a federal claim, 
 
84 Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 19, 19-21 (2008). Recent scholarly debate over the intended scope of “laws 
of the United States” casts some doubt on the inclusion of non-statutory law such as 
customary international law. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Constitution and the Law 
of Nations, 106 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1661 (2018). 
85 Steele, 344 U.S. at 282-84 (citing to Lanham Act §§ 39, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1121, 
1127) (emphasis added). 
86 In Morrison, the presumption was a matter of presumed congressional intent, a 
“canon of construction . . . rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate.” 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., , 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
87 Wasserman, supra note 77, at 702 (quoting Lea Brilmayer’s rule of substantive 
relevance: “The question is whether a particular fact may be pled and proven in order 
for the plaintiff to prevail in the identical civil action claiming a violation of the identical 
federal statute brought in state court”) (citation omitted). 
88 See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 
312 (2005). 
89 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
FINAL_CHON.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/19  11:34 PM 
2019] KONDO-ING STEELE V. BULOVA 119 
 
unless Congress has created exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts 
over a particular class of cases and the plaintiff can demonstrate that its 
claims “arise under” those laws through a well-pleaded complaint, that is, 
a complaint that raises federal issues in the claims (and does not 
anticipate them through defenses).90 
Yet, according to 28 U.S.C. § 1338, federal and state courts share 
concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over Lanham Act cases.91 This 
concurrent jurisdiction reflects the common law origins of current federal 
trademark law, rooted in the longstanding doctrine of unfair 
competition.92 As a result, state courts may also have opportunity to 
apply extraterritoriality tests.93 Of course, federal courts often exercise 
diversity or supplemental jurisdiction over state or common law claims of 
unfair competition, in addition to federal question jurisdiction over the 
Lanham Act claims. The absence of federalism balancing factors within 
trademark law more generally and in the Steele opinion itself suggests 
that the core concern of Steele was Congressional power, not federal 
versus state judicial competence to adjudicate Lanham Act claims. Thus, 
Steele decided a question of prescriptive jurisdiction – a merits issue – 
despite (perhaps inadvertently) characterizing it as an issue of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
B. Parsing Jurisdiction: Rules in Books 
At first glance what might appear to be an arcane procedural issue can 
be significant for strategic reasons. If successful, either type of 
dismissal—whether on subject matter jurisdiction grounds under FRCP 
12(b)(1) or on the merits under FRCP 12(b)(6)—will give a defendant 
procedural advantage by not allowing the case to proceed to the next, 
fact-finding stage of litigation. But different dismissal motions raise 
corresponding doctrinal and strategic advantages or disadvantages. 
Whether a motion for dismissal is brought on grounds of subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1) or on the merits pursuant to FRCP 
 
90 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 151-54 (1908). 
91 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). 
92 Id. This section confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts for patent, 
copyright, and other types of claims but does not include trademark claims in this list 
of exclusivity. See also, Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879) (“Here is no 
requirement that such person shall be engaged in the kind of commerce which 
Congress is authorized to regulate. It is a general declaration that anybody in the 
United States, and anybody in any other country which permits us to do the like, may, 
by registering a trade-mark, have it fully protected.”). 
93 Two state court cases decided extraterritoriality of the Lanham Act between 
1952 and 2016. Dornis, supra note 49, at 583-84. 
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12(b)(6) can matter in individual cases.94 The differences between them 
fall into four broad categories: Construction of facts, standard of pleading 
those facts, preclusive effect of judgment, and timing of the motions.  
Extraterritoriality provides a fifth dimension of analysis that affects the 
other four factors. 
1. Construing Facts 
According to the Arbaugh court, a trial judge can review evidence on 
contested facts in a FRCP 12(b)(1) decision.95 This power potentially 
takes the factual disputes away from the jury, which is institutionally 
empowered to find facts.  In practice, some courts sometimes treat 
contested facts in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion in the “light most favorable to 
the plaintiff”—a standard that has long been associated with FRCP 
12(b)(6) motions.96 The Ninth Circuit differentiates between facial and 
factual attacks: 
A facial attack asserts the allegations contained in the complaint are 
insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. A factual 
attack, in contrast, requires submission of evidence that calls into 
dispute the truth of the allegations that support jurisdiction.97 
Where the challenge goes beyond the allegations in the complaint to 
their evidentiary sufficiency, through affidavits or otherwise, courts in the 
Ninth Circuit will review evidence on those contested facts per Arbaugh.98 
Otherwise the courts in the Ninth Circuit will view the facts alleged in the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.   
2. The Requirement of Plausibility 
More significantly, however, the facts undergirding a FRCP 12(b)(1) 
motion are not required to meet the “plausibility” pleading standard that 
 
94 Of course, it is possible that the exact procedural device for challenging 
extraterritoriality may not make a difference, if the outcome of the extraterritoriality 
test is the same no matter what rule is applied. Answering that hypothetical scenario, 
however, would require an impossible experiment akin to a randomized controlled 
trial in which the same cases with the same facts are decided by the same judge on 
different rule-based motions. Some cases (such as Trader Joe’s Ninth Circuit 
decision) suggest that the result might be the same either way. Yet, other cases 
(discussed below) point to a different conclusion. See infra Part I. C. 
95 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501-02 (2006). 
96 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).  Pursuant to FRCP 12(d), if factual 
allegations go beyond a pleading, then the 12(b)(6) motion is converted a FRCP 56 
motion, which then turns on the presence or absence of any genuine dispute of 
material fact.   
97 See generally Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016). 
98 Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit treated the challenge as a facial one, 
without conflicting facts. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 501. 
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is required of factual allegations on the merits. The Supreme Court’s 
Twombly and Iqbal decisions up-ended the relatively liberal pleading 
standards of the federal procedural system.99 Now, notice pleading of 
any claims under FRCP 12(b)(6) requires more than the mere factual 
possibility — but rather the factual plausibility — of claims being alleged 
in a complaint.100 This pleading standard now applies to any substantive 
claims filed in federal court and can be particularly important where 
defendant is in possession of most of the relevant information (which is 
not necessarily as true of trademark cases as of employment 
discrimination cases). In any event, this more exacting pleading standard 
has not been applied to allegations of subject matter jurisdiction thus far. 
3. Preclusive Effect 
Additionally, a FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal is not on the merits and 
therefore does not have preclusive effect. This leaves the door open for 
a persistent plaintiff to re-file in a different court—which could be viewed 
as an advantage to the plaintiff unless the alternative forum is viewed as 
less favorable. Since the plaintiff typically has the choice of where to file, 
a dismissal based on subject matter jurisdiction grounds essentially 
negates that choice and forces the plaintiff into its “option B,” negating 
any initial forum-shopping decision. Nonetheless, the plaintiff still has a 
possible future day in court somewhere and some day because the 
dismissal based on subject matter jurisdiction is not considered to be on 
the merits. 
4. Timing 
A dismissal on FRCP 12(b)(1) grounds also has some material 
procedural advantages for a defendant, such as the ability to be made at 
any time, even on appeal, or be raised sua sponte by the judge.101 It 
might also result in dismissal of any supplemental jurisdiction claims 
based on state law, which are often alleged in cases invoking the Lanham 
Act. Moreover, for a defendant arguing that the reach of a U.S. statute is 
overly-broad, the symbolic significance of having a dismissal based on 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than on the merits, might be 
important.102 
 
99 See generally Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 516 (2007). 
100 See generally JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011); Aschroft, 556 U.S. 662; Bell Atlantic 
Corp., 550 U.S. 516. 
101 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 
102 Cf. Wasserman, supra note 46, at 312 (discussing the position of religious 
organizations that did not want secular authority to reach into religious affairs in the 
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5. Impact of Extraterritoriality Analysis 
Taken together, some characteristics of FRCP 12(b)(1) motions 
possibly make these types of motions more plaintiff-friendly than FRCP 
12(b)(6) motions. Most importantly, a dismissal on subject matter 
jurisdiction grounds typically does not end the case, so a plaintiff may 
have another bite at the proverbial apple in a different court.103 
Furthermore, Rule 12(b)(1) motions, unlike Rule 12(b)(6) motions, are 
not held to the standard of factual plausibility and any contested factual 
allegations may be subject to an evidentiary hearing. Typically, these 
factual issues go to the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts, 
such as citizenship of the parties. In an extraterritoriality analysis, the 
factual allegations address whether the plaintiff has satisfied the effects 
test—resulting in a potentially much larger scope of facts not subject to 
the plausibility pleading standard.  In addition, Rule 12(b)(1) motions may 
not include other defenses, such as those listed under FRCP 8(c).104 For 
all these reasons it might be easier for a plaintiff to withstand dismissal if 
extraterritoriality is analyzed via Rule 12(b)(1). Among the FRCP 12(b)(1) 
characteristics that tend to favor defendants is that these motions can be 
raised at any time.  
However, the extraterritoriality question changes this general calculus. 
Typically, if a federal court dismisses the case based on lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, then the plaintiff can re-file in state court, which then 
considers the same exact question of extraterritoriality.  Furthermore, in 
the case of the extraterritorial analysis, an alternative forum presumably 
might also be another country’s court (in addition to a state court with 
regard to any state law claims).105 For instance, Trader Joe’s had 
arguable legal avenues in Canada — even without a registered Canadian 
mark — but presumably decided against filing in Canada, favoring its 
home court advantage in the U.S. for strategic reasons.106 In these kinds 
of cases, the alternative forum is often alternative to both federal and 
 
context of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 
171 (2011)). 
103 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). 
104 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (listing defenses such as statute of limitations); 5B CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL §1350 (3d 
ed. 2004). 
105 Trader Joe’s’ complaint contained allegations of violations of Washington state 
law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of these claims, finding that they did not 
reach extraterritorially. See generally Katherine Florey, Bridging the Divide: The Case 
for Harmonizing State and Federal Extraterritoriality Principles After Morrison and 
Kiobel, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEVELOP. L. J. 197 (2014); Katherine 
Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the Extraterritorial 
Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. 535 (2012). 
106 See supra Part II C 
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state courts. For a plaintiff seeking a favorable application of U.S. law as 
opposed to a possibly more hostile application of foreign law in a foreign 
jurisdiction, this can pose a strategic disadvantage. It may also impact 
the issue of scope of claims and remedies.107 
A theoretical disadvantage for plaintiffs of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on 
the merits is that these dismissals are more likely to have preclusive 
effect.108  State courts are often faced with re-filed complaints after a 
federal court dismisses a case on the merits and with prejudice.  In most 
cases, the common law doctrine of claim preclusion will apply to bar the 
re-filing. In the case of foreign (particularly other non-common law) 
courts, the preclusive effect of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may depend 
upon whether a foreign jurisdiction has a similar preclusion doctrine.109 
Such a dismissal raises the possibility of not having a second bite at the 
apple, whether in the U.S. or in another country. Conversely, if the motion 
is granted, the defendant will win — possibly for all time, since it is often 
considered a final judgment on the merits — unless reversed on appeal. 
For all these reasons and more, FRCP 12(b)(1) motions are not 
completely fungible with Rule 12(b)(6) motions. 
C. Parsing Jurisdiction: Laws and Rules in Action110 
Interestingly, what seemed to have irked counsel for Trader Joe’s was 
not the district court’s reliance on federal subject matter jurisdiction per 
se (although the lawyers did argue vigorously against its application, as 
will be discussed below). Rather, their main objection appeared to be that 
the case was dismissed “with prejudice.”111 Having been given ample 
 
107 Trimble, supra note 43. 
108 District courts will often allow leave to amend under Rule 15 and therefore allow 
at least one Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal without prejudice to amendment. See, e.g., 
Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 521 (7th Cir. 2015). 
109 Again, a successful Rule 12(b)(6) motion, particularly one granted after 
opportunity to amend to cure defects after successive motions, may be granted “with 
prejudice.” JOE S. CECIL ET AL., supra note 100, at 7 n.12 (citing Chudnovsky v. Leviton 
Mfg. Co., 158 F. App’x 312, 314 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
110 The data discussed in this part of the article is based on Professor Tim Dornis’s 
database comprised of all published cases between 1952 and 2016. Tim W. Dornis, 
Database of Post-Steele Cases (2016) (unpublished) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Dornis Database]. 
111 Brief for Appellant at 17, Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-35035) 
(“Although Hallatt never sought dismissal without leave to amend, and even though 
Trader Joe’s expressly requested leave to amend in its opposition (D. Ct. Dkt. No. 28 
at 18), the court dismissed Trader Joe’s Lanham Act claims with prejudice and 
without leave to amend”) (emphasis added). At oral argument, however, counsel for 
Trader Joe’s specifically disclaimed any desire to further amend – despite having 
(and ultimately taking) the opportunity to amend its complaint. Transcript of Oral 
Argument, Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-35035). 
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opportunity to amend its original complaint (and having in fact done so), 
Trader Joe’s chose to move forward with the same allegations in its 
second amended complaint.112 Notably, both parties seem to have 
agreed that FRCP 12(b)(1) or FRCP 12(b)(6) were perfect substitutes for 
deciding the issue of extraterritoriality even though, as the preceding 
section demonstrates, these motions have different procedural 
consequences. Overall, these incongruities reflect the messiness of laws 
(and rules) “in action” — which this section considers briefly.   
In its appellate brief, Trader Joe’s argued that: 
Under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, district courts 
have subject-matter jurisdiction over all claims arising under federal 
law, including the Lanham Act. While Congress may place additional 
limits on this jurisdiction, it must do so using clear language. 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. . . . . 
Relying on Timberlane and other pre-Arbaugh case law, the district 
court found that the Lanham Act limited its subject-matter jurisdiction 
over claims with extraterritorial reach. But nothing in the Lanham Act 
expresses any congressional intent—much less clear intent—to 
restrict the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts in Lanham 
Act cases. On the contrary, through “sweeping” language, Congress 
extended the Lanham Act to all “commerce within the control of 
Congress.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.113 
Trader Joe’s argument seems sufficiently straightforward on its face. 
Nevertheless, the previous sections show why the doctrinal situation is a 
bit more complex than presented by this brief. In reality, as a strategic 
matter, it is unlikely that Trader Joe’s would have re-filed in state court 
after dismissal in federal court.114 Nor was it blind-sided by a Rule 
12(b)(1) motion made after the pre-trial period (as had been the case in 
 
112 Transcript of Oral Argument, Hallat II, supra note 111. It is not clear why the 
district court chose to grant Hallatt’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion “with prejudice,” — which 
is an indication that the court thought it ought not to be re-filed anywhere, despite the 
jurisdictional basis for dismissal.   
113 Brief for Appellant, supra note 111, at 19; see also Brief for Appellee at 19, 
Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-35035) ("[i]f the Court were to find that 
Arbaugh applies and that the question of extraterritorial application of the Lanham 
Act is a merits question rather than a subject matter jurisdiction question, the 
Timberlane inquiry remains the same. Indeed, if the Court were to so hold and 
remand this matter, Hallatt would simply be required to file the identical motion, but 
characterize the motion as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings."). 
114 If Trader Joe’s had re-filed in state court, the claim might have been precluded. 
In the event that the state court heard the case, then the extraterritoriality test would 
be the same as the test applied in the federal district court – yet another clue that it 
is not a question about subject matter jurisdiction. Wasserman, supra note 77, at 702 
(citing to Lea Brilmayer’s rule of substantive relevance). 
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Arbaugh). Instead, Trader Joe’s was likely worried about litigating in 
Canada where its legal position might be less favorable or result in 
delay.115 
Moreover, the Trader Joe’s brief did not cite to any caselaw besides 
Arbaugh to support its point regarding the distinction between merits and 
subject matter jurisdiction. This is not as surprising. Prior to Trader Joe’s, 
no other circuit court had held that extraterritoriality should be treated as 
a merits issue in the context of the Lanham Act. In fact, at least seven 
circuit courts continue to characterize this as a subject matter jurisdiction 
question still controlled by Steele.116 As of the time of this publication, no 
circuit court has followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit in jettisoning this 
categorization – though some district courts seem to have done so.117 
 
115 E-mail from Carys Craig, Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, to 
author (Feb. 4, 2019) (on file with author) (“We do have case law that suggests that 
mere advertising in Canada in the absence of providing any actual services in 
Canada is not sufficient to constitute use in Canada . . . . That said, they still had 
plenty of avenues open to them, if they wanted to protect their position in Canada. 
First, they could have commenced use in Canada and could then have immediately 
obtained the registration. Alternatively (although this would have meant giving up 
their 2010 priority date), they could have re-applied to register in Canada on the basis 
of their US registration without use in Canada (s. 16(2)), or by showing that they had 
made the mark well known in Canada through advertising to potential dealers/users 
(s. 16(1)).”); see also E-mail from Carys Craig, Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall 
Law School, to author (Mar. 4, 2019) (on file with author) (“Trader Joe’s could also 
have asserted common law trademark rights in the Vancouver/BC area by providing 
evidence that its reputation and goodwill extended over the US-Canada border 
notwithstanding the absence of local use (cp. Orkin Exterminating Co. Inc. v. Pestco 
Co., 50 OR (2d) 726). In the Orkin case, a Canadian company adopted a well-known 
but purely US-based mark and was held liable for passing off in Ontario.”). 
116 Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(conducting a Lanham Act extraterritorial analysis under FRCP 12(b)(1)); McBee v. 
Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (same); Scanvec Amiable Ltd. v. 
Chang, No. 02–4385, 2003 WL 22597067, at *180-81 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Liberty 
Toy Co. v. Fred Silber Co., No. 97-3177, 1998 WL 385469, at *6 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(remanding for application of “substantial effects” test under FRCP 12(b)(1)); 
Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(analyzing Lanham Act extraterritorial analysis under FRCP 12(b)(1)); Am. Rice, Inc. 
v. Arkansas Rice Growers Co-op. Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408, 417 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); 
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) (same). In 
addition, some district courts have resolved this in favor of subject matter jurisdiction 
despite the absence of controlling precedent. See Int’l Acad. of Bus. & Fin. Mgmt., 
Ltd. v. Mentz, No. 12-CV-00463-CMA-BNB, 2013 WL 212640 (D. Colo. Jan. 18, 
2013) (finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction under “substantial or significant” 
effects test); Basis Int’l Ltd. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1306 
(D.N.M. 2011) (finding subject matter jurisdiction under “significant effects” test). 
117 IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 3d 95, 121 (D.D.C. 2018); IPOX 
Schuster, LLC v. Nikko Asset Mgmt. Co., 191 F. Supp. 3d 790, 804 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 
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In circuits that explicitly classify this issue as a question of subject 
matter jurisdiction, some lower courts have nonetheless decided this 
issue on FRCP 12(b)(6) grounds. Examination of a recently compiled 
database of all Lanham Act extraterritoriality cases decided between 
1952 and 2016 reveals that forty-four cases were decided on preliminary 
motions.118 Of the forty-four cases, at least fifteen courts decided 
extraterritoriality on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds.119 The other twenty-nine 
(including the Trader Joe’s district court) were decided on FRCP 12(b)(1) 
grounds.120 Twelve of these forty-four cases overlapped both categories 
and involved simultaneous consideration of Rules 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6).121 In addition, out of these twelve cases, four courts found 
 
(“The Court will thus analyze Nikko’s motion under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting the well-
pleaded allegations in IPOX’s complaint as true and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in IPOX’s favor”). 
118 Dornis Database, supra note 110. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See, e.g., JMC Rest. Holdings, LLC v. Pevida, No. 14CV6157WFKVMS, 2015 
WL 9450597, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2015) (granting FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) 
motions); Kroma Makeup EU, Ltd. v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc., No. 6:14-
CV-1551-ORL, 2015 WL 1708757, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2015) (denying FRCP 
12(b)(6) dismissal after defendant moved for both FRCP  12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) 
dismissals); Gibson Brands Inc. v. Viacom Int’l Inc., No. CV 12-10870 DDP AJWX, 
2013 WL 5940826, at * 6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (granting FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal 
and dismissing FRCP 12(b)(6) motion as moot), rev’d and remanded, 640 F. App’x 
677 (9th Cir. 2016); Hong Leong Fin. Ltd. (Singapore) v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd., 
No. 12 CIV. 6010 JMF, 2013 WL 5746126 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2013) (finding subject-
matter jurisdiction but dismissing under FRCP 12(b)(6)); RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Zaller, 
978 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (granting FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal after 
defendant moved for both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) dismissals); Airwair Int’l Ltd. 
v. Vans, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-05060-EJD, 2013 WL 3786309 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2013) 
(granting FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal after defendant moved for both FRCP 12(b)(1) 
and FRCP 12(b)(6) dismissals); Schreiber v. Dunabin, 938 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601-02 
(E.D. Va. 2013) (granting FRCP 12(b)(1) and FRCP 12(b)(6) motions); Pinkberry, 
Inc. v. JEC Int’l Corp., No. CV 11-6540 PSG PJWX, 2011 WL 6101828, at *8 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 7, 2011) (granting FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal and dismissing FRCP 12(b)(6) 
motion as moot); Mertik Maxitrol GMBH & Co. KG v. Honeywell Techs. Sarl, No. 10-
12257, 2011 WL 1454067, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2011) (finding subject-matter 
jurisdiction but dismissing under FRCP 12(b)(6); Warnaco Inc. v. VF Corp., 844 F. 
Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (raising and finding subject-matter sua sponte and 
dismissing defendant’s FRCP 12(b)(6) motion); Spartan Chem. Co. v. ATM 
Enterprises of Am., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29147 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 1986) (finding 
subject-matter jurisdiction but dismissing under FRCP 12(b)(6); Ramirez & Feraud 
Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (finding subject-
matter jurisdiction and denying FRCP 12(b)(6) dismissal) aff’d, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 
1957). 
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subject matter jurisdiction but then dismissed on the merits.122 Notably, 
a recent case not captured in this data set, Charisma World Wide Corp., 
S.A. v. Avon Products Inc.,123 exemplifies a 12(b)(6) dismissal despite 
controlling circuit precedent treating this question as a Rule 12(b)(1) 
issue. 
Furthermore, at least twenty-two courts have decided this issue on 
summary judgment under FRCP 56 — and at least one after a jury trial.124  
This may reflect the fact that objections based on subject matter 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time.125 Or, despite stated precedent, it 
may be that these courts already view prescriptive jurisdiction as at least 
partly a merits issue in the context of the Lanham Act. In the larger 
strategic context, little to no empirical evidence exists of cases re-filed in 
state court after a federal court’s FRCP 12(b)(1) dismissal.126 And with 
only one exception,127 no published case decided after Steele shows that 
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion or dismissal was made after an early pretrial stage 
of litigation.  
Overall, this empirical analysis indicates that despite broad judicial 
consensus at the circuit court level, which still treats extraterritoriality 
nominally as a subject matter jurisdiction question, the actual practice on 
the ground since Steele has been variable. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding is not completely out of line with other decisions. Returning to the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Trader Joe’s: 
The constitutional source of [congressional] authority [to regulate 
interstate and foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause] is 
the same whether or not the alleged infringement implicates the 
extraterritorial scope of the Lanham Act: Congress can no more 
regulate intrastate, non-commercial possession of another’s mark 
. . . than trademark infringement that occurs entirely outside of the 
country’s borders.128 
This language indicates that the court was grappling with a question of 
prescriptive jurisdiction: What constitutes activity “in commerce” sufficient 
to allow Congress to assert its regulatory authority over this activity 
pursuant to its interstate and foreign commerce power? However, the 
opinion does not explicitly discuss the difference between prescriptive 
 
122 Dornis Database, supra note 110. 
123 243 F. Supp. 3d 450 (2017). 
124 See, e.g., Groeneveld Transport Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Intern., Inc., 730 
F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2013). 
125 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 
126 See Dornis, supra note 49, at 572. The cases listed in the Dornis database do 
not include cases decided after 2016. See Dornis Database, supra note 110. 
127 See Aerogroup Intern., Inc v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 955 F.Supp. 220 
(1997). Again, this statement does not cover post-2016 decisions. 
128 Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). 
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and adjudicative jurisdiction. Nor does it explicitly address the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the Lanham Act with regard to purely intrastate 
commerce – as, for example, in The Trade-Mark Cases.129 Instead, the 
decision relies heavily on Ninth Circuit precedent such as La Quinta 
Worldwide v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V.,130 wherein the court held that 
intrastate commerce was not within the ambit of Congress’ power to 
regulate pursuant to its commerce power. In regards to any conflicting 
Ninth Circuit precedent, the decision also relied on Miller v. Gammie, 
which instructs Ninth Circuit panels to consider the effect of Supreme 
Court decisions on prior circuit precedent.131 Following Miller, if a 
Supreme Court decision undercuts the theory or reasoning behind the 
prior precedent, a Ninth Circuit panel can ignore a previous panel’s 
precedent.132 Yet, while both Arbaugh and Morrison strongly indicate that 
the Supreme Court wants to put its jurisdictional house in order, so to 
speak, they are too domain-specific to undercut Steele and its progeny 
entirely.133 
At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as well as the variation 
among courts suggest an on-going conceptual confusion about the basis 
for the jurisdictional categorization of extraterritoriality. While courts 
nominally treat this issue as one of subject matter jurisdiction in the 
context of the Lanham Act, it is an issue that can also be decided on the 
merits via FRCP 12(b)(6). As Justice Scalia noted in Morrison: 
In view of this error, which the parties do not dispute, petitioners ask 
us to remand. We think that unnecessary. Since nothing in the 
analysis of the courts below turned on the mistake, a remand would 
 
129 Cf. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879) (“Here is no requirement that 
such person shall be engaged in the kind of commerce which Congress is authorized 
to regulate. It is a general declaration that anybody in the United States, and anybody 
in any other country which permits us to do the like, may, by registering a trade-mark, 
have it fully protected.”). 
130 La Quinta Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V., 762 F.3d 867, 872 (9th 
Cir. 2014). 
131 Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
132 See Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 967-68 n.4 (citing to Miller, 335 F.3d at 893). The 
Miller rule, however, does not give a great deal of guidance to Ninth Circuit panels 
on how to assess the undercutting theory, and therefore has led to some uncertainty 
in its application. See BENNETT EVAN COOPER, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE: NINTH 
CIRCUIT § 20:4 (2018) (Prior Ninth Circuit Decisions: Exceptions to Law of Circuit). 
133 See generally Rochelle Dreyfuss & Linda Silberman, Misappropriation on a 
Global Scale: Extraterritoriality and Applicable Law in Transborder Trade Secrecy 
Cases, 8 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 265, 265, 297 (2017) (“These cases suggest 
that the type of intellectual property might matter to the extraterritorial analysis.”). 
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only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label for the same Rule 12(b)(1) 
conclusion.134 
Perhaps it is not an urgent matter to tidy up this uncertainty. Yet, the 
courts may be missing nuanced costs and benefits attached to either 
motion when they fail to remand to the district court for a hearing on the 
merits. Wasserman argues that the entanglement of jurisdiction with 
merits is simply wrong. As he states: 
Congress has made them distinct. . . . Relevant positive law 
establishes that there is a cause of action, there is jurisdiction, and 
the two must be handled differently.135 
And the Supreme Court itself has signaled dissatisfaction with “drive-by 
jurisdictional rulings,”136 making it even more appropriate for the Court to 
step in and clarify the jurisdiction or merits question in the 
extraterritoriality analysis for the Lanham Act. 
II. EFFECTS OF THE EFFECTS TEST 
A. Effects in Books 
Part I argues that the Steele Court may have made a category mistake, 
confusing prescriptive jurisdiction with adjudicative jurisdiction. The Court 
mischaracterized the nature of the jurisdictional question presented — 
possibly because the effects test was still in its infancy when Steele was 
decided. Indeed, Bulova’s brief did not seem to characterize the 
extraterritoriality issue as one of subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, 
Bulova had argued: 
The existence of jurisdiction to protect foreign commerce against 
other types of anti-competitive acts abroad is illustrated in a long line 
of Sherman Act cases. The basis for jurisdiction embraces two 
principal aspects—personal jurisdiction over one or more of the 
alleged conspirators, whether domestic or foreign . . . and the effect 
of the alleged acts or conduct upon the foreign commerce of the 
United States under the Sherman Act.137 
This Part argues that the effects test itself, regardless of its jurisdictional 
classification, also needs updating and clarification.138 The Supreme 
Court’s stance toward extraterritorial jurisdiction analysis, whether 
 
134 Morrison v. Nat’l Aus. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 354 (9th Cir. 2003). 
135 Wasserman, supra note 77, at 672. 
136 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)). 
137 Brief for Respondent at 28, Steele v. Bulova Watch Company, Inc., 342 U.S. 
280 (1952) ((No. 38), 1952 WL 82566) (emphasis added). 
138 See generally Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth 
Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455 (2008). 
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prescriptive or adjudicative, has evolved considerably since Steele. As 
previously stated, the RJR Nabisco test involves two steps: first, 
ascertaining whether the statute gives “clear affirmative indication that it 
applies extraterritorially” and second determining “whether the case 
involves a domestic application of the statute.”139 Yet Steele begs the 
question of whether the Lanham Act includes a “clear, affirmative” 
indication that Congress intended its extraterritorial application. Steele 
was decided under an incipient analytical framework for assessing 
extraterritorial reach — a framework that has developed tremendously in 
the intervening sixty-plus years. 
Even if step one of RJR Nabisco is indeed satisfied, and it is well-
settled as a matter of statutory interpretation that Congress did intend the 
Lanham Act to reach beyond the borders of the U.S., it is not clear how 
the second step incorporates Lanham Act-related effects, especially if 
these effects are primarily or wholly reputation based. As Professor Tim 
Dornis has observed: 
Notably, the development of “effects on US commerce” into the most 
influential test element and its widely overlooked foundation in pre-
Lanham Act common law doctrine can be explained as one of the 
most determinative features of current law.140 
And finally, neither step of  RJR Nabisco clearly addresses the role of 
comity and other factors. A court’s decision to apply a statute 
extraterritoriality is one of discretion, not mandate. If the statute is silent, 
then non-statutory factors are necessary to guide the decisions of courts. 
The courts currently applying the effects test are relying on a multi-
factored set of judicially-developed standards to engage in this guided 
discretion. 
The Supreme Court’s recent look at the “conduct and-or effects” test 
in Morrison found that test,  as developed by the lower courts in the 
context of securities fraud, to be sadly lacking.141 The majority went on 
 
139 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2094 (2016) (“If the 
conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, then the case 
involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred abroad; 
but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case 
involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct 
that occurred in U.S. territory.”). 
140 Dornis, supra note 49, at 572; see generally TIM W. DORNIS, TRADEMARK AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION CONFLICTS HISTORICAL-COMPARATIVE, DOCTRINAL, AND 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (2017). 
141 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 257-58 (2010) (quoting Bersch 
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (1975)) (the “Second Circuit had excised 
the presumption against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence  . . . and replaced it 
with the inquiry whether it would be reasonable (and hence what Congress would 
have wanted) to apply the statute to a given situation. As long as there was 
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to decry the unpredictability and uncertainty caused by the conduct and-
or effects test,142 and replaced this multi-factor test with a neon-bright 
line rule that the purchase and sale of securities must be in the U.S. for 
the federal courts to exert prescriptive jurisdiction over a federal 
securities fraud case: 
For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks 
all contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption 
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog 
indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity 
is involved in the case.143 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg concurred only in the judgment. Their 
view was that 
[T]he real question in this case is how much, and what kinds of, 
domestic contacts are sufficient to trigger application of § 10(b). In 
developing its conduct and-or effects test, the Second Circuit 
endeavored to derive a solution from the Exchange Act’s text, 
structure, history, and purpose. Judge Friendly and his colleagues 
were well aware that United States courts ‘cannot and should not 
expend [their] resources resolving cases that do not affect 
Americans or involve fraud emanating from America.’144 
Morrison casts considerable uncertainty upon Steele. To be sure, the 
specific question considered by Morrison involved the application of a 
type of effects test in lieu of the first step — whether the statutory 
language indicates its extraterritorial application. This threshold question 
arguably was answered in the affirmative by Steele and even possibly 
endorsed by Morrison, which cited approvingly to Steele in passing.145 
The cumulative inference from this and other relatively recent and 
approving citations146 is that the Supreme Court still approves of Steele. 
 
prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate, the Second Circuit explained, whether to apply § 
10(b) even to “predominantly foreign” transactions became a matter of whether a 
court thought Congress ‘wished the precious resources of United States courts and 
law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to 
foreign countries.’”). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 266. 
144 Id. at 281 (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring) (emphasis added). 
145 Id. at 283 n.11. 
146 See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 251 (1991) 
(“In Steele, we addressed whether the Lanham Act, designed to prevent deceptive 
and misleading use of trademarks, applied to acts of a United States citizen 
consummated in Mexico . . . . The EEOC’s attempt to analogize these cases to 
Steele is unpersuasive. The Lanham Act by its terms applies to ‘all commerce which 
may lawfully be regulated by Congress.’ . . . The Constitution gives Congress the 
power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
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But, does the Lanham Act truly indicate a “clear, affirmative” intent by 
Congress to legislate extraterritorially? 
Furthermore, would not the general skepticism expressed in Morrison 
toward the “conduct-and-or effects” test within the context of federal 
securities laws equally apply to the effects test (or more accurately, tests) 
developed in the wake of Steele? Different circuits have articulated 
various effects tests. For example, in the early and influential Vanity Fair 
v. Eaton case,147 the Second Circuit required “substantial” effect — a rule 
that was subsequently adopted by a few other circuits.148 Others, like the 
Ninth Circuit, require only “some” effect.”149 And still other circuits have 
articulated this test as “significant” effect.150 The Restatement (Fourth) of 
U.S. Foreign Relations Law offers the “substantial” effect version of 
prescriptive jurisdiction.151   
The Ninth Circuit has a specific judicial gloss on its “some effect” test. 
As enunciated in 1975, the Ninth Circuit’s Timberlane test states a 
tripartite rule of reason in the context of antitrust extraterritoriality: 
As acknowledged above, the antitrust laws require in the first 
instance that there be some effect actual or intended on American 
foreign commerce before the federal courts may legitimately 
exercise subject matter jurisdiction under those statutes. Second, a 
 
and with the Indian Tribes.’ U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Since the Act expressly 
stated that it applied to the extent of Congress’ power over commerce, the Court in 
Steele concluded that Congress intended that the statute apply abroad.”) 
Id. at 252. 
147 Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) 
(adopting test requiring “substantial effect” on United States commerce). 
148  Int’l Cafe, S.A.L., v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 
(11th Cir. 2001) (finding no “substantial effect” on United States commerce); Liberty 
Toy Co. v. Fred Silber Co., No. 97-3177, 1998 WL 385469, at *6 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(remanding for application of “substantial effects” test); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton 
Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) (adopting test requiring “substantial effect” on 
United States commerce). 
149  Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(finding subject matter jurisdiction given “some effect” on United States commerce); 
Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(requiring “some effect” on United States commerce); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells 
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977) (adopting the Timberlane 
“some effects” rule of reason in the context of the Lanham Act). 
150  McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting test 
requiring “significant effect” on United States commerce); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. 
Aeropower Co. Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring “significant effect” 
on United States commerce). See also Scanvec Amiable Ltd. v. Chang, 80 F. App’x 
171, 181 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopting a variant satisfied by either significant or substantial 
effect). 
151 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (2018). 
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greater showing of burden or restraint may be necessary to 
demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to present a 
cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of 
the antitrust laws. . . . Third, there is the additional question which is 
unique to the international setting of whether the interests of, and 
links to, the United States including the magnitude of the effect on 
American foreign commerce are sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis those 
of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.152 
Since this original formulation, the Ninth Circuit has also developed 
seven different “comity” factors to assess further the third part of the test: 
[1] the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, 
[2] the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or 
principal places of business of corporations, 
[3] the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected 
to achieve compliance, 
[4] the relative significance of effects on the United States as 
compared with those elsewhere, 
[5] the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect 
American commerce, 
[6] the foreseeability of such effect, and 
[7] the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within 
the United States as compared with conduct abroad.153 
Steele’s original doctrinal framework did not provide any of these glosses 
(whether “substantial,” “significant,” or “some” effects), and listed only a 
few relevant comity factors. Whatever the exact form of the effects test, 
courts such as the Ninth Circuit engage in guided discretion regarding 
the decision to extend the extraterritoriality presumably allowed by the 
Lanham Act. 
As various scholars have noted, comity is an ill-understood term.  
Succinctly defined as “deference to foreign government actors that is not 
required by international law but is incorporated in domestic law,”154 this 
 
152 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613-
15 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). 
153 Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960, 973-75 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit developed 
these multiple factors in Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co. 769 F.2d 1393, 
1395 (9th Cir. 1985). 
154 Dodge, supra note 47, at 2078; see also Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of 
International Comity, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 20 (2008) (“Scholars and courts 
have characterized international comity inconsistently as a choice-of-law principle, a 
synonym for private international law, a rule of public International law, a moral 
obligation expediency, courtesy, reciprocity, utility, or diplomacy. Authorities disagree 
as to whether comity is a rule of natural law, custom, treaty, or domestic law. Indeed, 
FINAL_CHON.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/19  11:34 PM 
134 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. [Vol. 25:2 
 
characterization belies the complexity of comity in all its forms as it is 
currently deployed.  For example, “[d]eference to foreign lawmakers has 
been categorized as ‘prescriptive comity,’ deference to foreign tribunals 
has been labelled as ‘adjudicative comity,’ and deference to foreign 
governments as litigants can be called ‘sovereign party comity.’”155 The 
first comity factor considered by the Ninth Circuit — that is, the degree of 
conflict with foreign law or policy—does not begin to capture all these 
different aspects of the term. 
As to the question of the jurisdiction-merits classification previously 
discussed in Part I, these additional seven factors complicate the 
question of adjudicative or prescriptive jurisdiction by adding a layer 
referred to as prescriptive comity (as opposed to adjudicative comity).156 
In addition to satisfying comity concerns, courts also still must find 
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, which may form an 
additional barrier to hearing a case.157 Parenthetically, more than a 
passing phenotypic resemblance exists between Judge Learned Hand’s 
articulation of the effects test in the 1945 Alcoa decision158 and the 
 
there is not even agreement that comity is a rule of law at all. Although other 
jurisdictions sometimes employ the term comity as a synonym for diplomatic 
immunity, in the United States comity has served as a principle of deference to foreign 
law and foreign courts.”). 
155 See generally Paul, supra note 154; see also Gardner, supra note 47, at 393 
(“When people speak of forum non conveniens as a comity doctrine, they usually 
have in mind negative adjudicative comity—of restraining the U.S. court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction to avoid  are meant to demonstrate respect for foreign legal systems. But 
such dismissals can run counter to positive comity commitments as well: either the 
positive adjudicative comity commitment to allow foreigners access to U.S. courts, or 
the positive prescriptive comity commitment to apply foreign law when appropriate. 
Too little sensitivity to these positive comity commitments in transnational litigation 
can undermine reciprocity between countries, which in turn jeopardizes the interests 
of private parties.”). 
156 See generally Gardner, supra note 47 (discussing adjudicative comity in the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens); Dodge, supra note 45, at 2124 (“Even when 
adjudicative comity operates as a principle of restraint—the area in which 
international comity doctrines like forum non conveniens most frequently take the 
form of standards—more rule-like alternatives exist.”). 
157 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & MARKETA TRIMBLE LANDOVA, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 39-40 (Foundation Press 4th ed. 2015) (“Personal 
Jurisdiction, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and the Territorial Scope of Applicable Law. 
What connections exist among personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and 
the territorial scope of applicable law? Although they are three separate concepts, an 
inquiry into the territorial scope of applicable law can arise in analyses of personal 
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
158 Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 1455, 1472 (2008) (citing to United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 
148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945)) (noting that Judge Hand held “that agreements, 
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Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction “contacts” test in International 
Shoe v. State of Washington,159 decided in the same year. Both of these 
tests exemplify an urge to fashion a “reasonableness” test perceived 
during the mid-century as more responsive to cross-border commercial 
activity than the rigid territorially-based tests prevalent then. However, it 
goes without saying that this fairness or reasonableness-based approach 
to prescriptive jurisdiction on the one hand, and personal jurisdiction on 
the other, faces tremendous challenges in this era of digitized and 
pervasive global commerce. With trademark law’s extraterritorial reach, 
“national and international regimes are competing for the right to 
regulate.”160 
Since Steele, the circuits have served as laboratories for the 
development of different versions of the effects test to guide discretion of 
the courts. And regardless of whether the doctrinal differences in these 
circuit-specific tests cause differences in outcome, it is now apparent that 
the circuits have different rates of finding extraterritoriality.161  The Ninth 
Circuit reasoning in Trader Joe’s arguably exemplifies why its rate is the 
highest among circuits. 
B. Effects in Action 
Trader Joe’s had argued to the Ninth Circuit that the Timberlane 
factors were superseded by Arbaugh and other cases.162 However, the 
Ninth Circuit declined the appellant’s invitation to re-write the Timberlane 
test.163 While it rejected the subject matter jurisdiction label, it then 
evaluated on the merits whether Hallatt’s activities had “some effect” on 
American commerce. It viewed its application of Timberlane as fulfilling 
step two of RJR Nabisco: 
 
though made abroad, are still unlawful if they are intended to affect imports and 
actually do affect them”). 
159 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also generally Paul, 
supra note 154. 
160 Morris, supra note 46, at 47. 
161 See generally Dornis, supra note 49, at 572. 
162 It is not at all clear whether the Timberlane test remains viable on its own terms. 
The test was first devised for antitrust cases, and it has since been abandoned in that 
context. See McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 814 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(explaining that the Timberlane decision is superseded by statute). The test also was 
devised as a method for determining the limits of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather 
than the substantive scope of the statute, but concerns about the limited reach of 
judicial power are no longer at issue.” Brief for Appellant, supra note 111, at 32. 
163 See Hallatt II, 835 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2016). The original Timberlane 
opinion blurred the lines between Rules FRCP 12(b)(1), FRCP 12(b)(6), and FRCP 
56, ultimately deciding the case on the merits, despite its language referencing 
subject matter jurisdiction. Timberlane, Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A, 
549 F.2d 597, 601-03 (1976). 
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We next consider the limits, if any, Congress imposed on the Act’s 
extraterritorial application. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S.Ct. at 2101 
(discussing ‘‘step two’’). In 15 U.S.C. § 1127, Congress directed that 
the Lanham Act applies to ‘‘all commerce which may lawfully be 
regulated by Congress.’’ Whether this provision sweeps foreign 
activities into the Act’s proscriptive reach depends on a three-part 
test we originally applied to the Sherman Act in Timberlane . . . . See 
Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 427 (extending Timberlane test to the 
Lanham Act).164 
With this doctrinal backdrop, the Ninth’s Circuit found that: 
Plaintiffs usually satisfy Timberlane’s first and second prongs by 
alleging that infringing goods, though sold initially in a foreign 
country, flowed into American domestic markets . . . . 
Trader Joe’s alleges that Hallatt’s foreign conduct has ‘‘some effect’’ 
on American commerce because his activities harm its reputation 
and decrease the value of its American-held trademarks. It argues 
that Hallatt violates 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), the Lanham Act’s 
general prohibition on trademark infringement, by transporting and 
selling Trader Joe’s goods without using proper quality control 
measures or established product recall practices.165 
Extraterritoriality aside, this “any harm to goodwill” approach to satisfying 
the “some effects” test has potential to create mischief in U.S. trademark 
doctrine. The court specifically did not limit its holding to the facts, which 
involve perishable food products where the risk to human health is 
greater than other areas of re-sold goods.166 Although the court invoked 
Section 1114 of the statute based on consumer confusion, its holding 
relies almost entirely on potential reputation-based damage that may or 
may not have caused confusion or have occurred within the borders of 
the U.S.167 
In the course of the court’s denial of the FRCP 12(b)(6) motion, the 
Ninth Circuit also minimized a potential first sale defense: 
Trader Joe’s seeks to circumvent the first sale doctrine, which 
establishes that “resale by the first purchaser of the original article 
under the producer’s trademark is generally neither trademark 
infringement nor unfair competition.” The quality control theory of 
infringement is cognizable under the Lanham Act notwithstanding 
the first sale doctrine: “[d]istribution of a product that does not meet 
 
164 Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 969. 
165 Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 969-70 (emphasis added). 
166 Id. at 963, 970. 
167 Id. at 977. 
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the trademark holder’s quality control standards may result in the 
devaluation of the mark by tarnishing its image.”168 
And despite clear statements in both appellate briefs, as well as in oral 
argument, that Trader Joe’s had not commenced use and therefore did 
not have enforceable rights yet in Canada,169 the Ninth Circuit 
downplayed the importance of “use” in the context of enforceable 
trademark rights, preferring to focus on use inside the territorial 
boundaries of the U.S. rather than the lack of use inside Canada.170 It 
also did not consider the application of any applicable Canadian first sale 
defense.  If comity doctrines call on courts either “to avoid stepping on 
the toes of foreign states” or “to step temporarily into the shoes of foreign 
sovereigns to protect those sovereigns’ interests,”171 then a more 
comprehensive analysis of conflicts and comity might consider whether 
Trader Joe’s should have waited until it perfected its pending Canadian 
applications before filing suit (1) in Canada; (2) against a Canadian 
citizen; (3) for activities in Canada; and (4) in connection with what is 
essentially a Canadian business operation. While it may be true that no 
adversarial proceeding existed in Canada, that is because there was no 
use by Trader Joe’s as an on-going business in Canada.172  
 The U.S. court’s minimization of the current use requirement in 
Canadian trademark law, similar to U.S. law’s contemporary “use in 
commerce” requirement, raises an issue of whether U.S. courts have the 
institutional competence to analyze comity factors such as the degree of 
conflict with foreign law or policy, or the relative importance of the 
 
168 Id. at 970 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
169 Hallatt had argued: 
Trader Joe’s does not have enforceable trademark rights in Canada, as it has 
not yet commenced use of the marks in Canada. . . . Moreover, even if Trader 
Joe’s had enforceable rights in Canada—which it does not—Canada has its own 
trademark law which does not mirror the U.S. trademark law and which, indeed, 
has some significant differences from U.S. law in material respects [citing to 
sources analyzing Canadian anti-dilution laws]. 
Appellee’s Answering Brief at 31, Trader Joe’s v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(No. 14-35035). Trader Joe’s had argued: 
Trader Joe’s . . . has two trademark applications pending in Canada. Those 
applications do not constitute an adversarial proceeding between the parties. 
While Canadian law, like U.S. law, allows for opposition of a trademark 
application, Hallatt has never availed himself of this process. It is too late for him 
to do so now, because the Canadian Intellectual Property Office issued notices 
of allowances for both of Trader Joe’s applications in 2012. 
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 111, at 45 (citation omitted). 
170 Hallatt II, 835 F.3d at 973. 
171 Gardner, supra note 47, at 392-93 (original emphasis). 
172 Canada is transitioning to a registration-based system of trademark rights. But 
as of the time of this writing, Canadian trademark laws are use-based. Bita Amani & 
Carys Craig, The ‘Jus’ of Use: Trademarks in Transition, 30 I.P.J. 217, 220 (2018). 
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violations within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. 
After all, Trader Joe’s involved relatively easy-to-understand common 
law jurisprudence in Canada: an English (and French) language 
jurisdiction. 
If prescriptive comity is supposed to function as a type of deference to 
foreign lawmakers,173 Trader Joe’s indicates that courts can pay lip 
service to it in the context of the Lanham Act. This approach is in direct 
contrast to the Morrison Court’s injunction that only direct sales of 
securities within the domestic territory of the U.S. can trigger liability 
under the federal securities laws. The arguably favorable attitude toward 
extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act further opens the door for 
litigants (whether U.S. nationals or not) to take advantage of more 
favorable laws in the U.S. regarding anti-dilution or other claims, without 
an adequate showing of connecting activities within the U.S.174  
Across circuits, courts have found extraterritorial application in over 60 
percent of reported cases.175 Post-Steele extraterritoriality analysis has 
evolved towards plaintiff-friendliness, whether it relates to procedure and 
substance. In analyzing the decisions of courts applying the Timberlane 
test between 1952-2016, Dornis has found a high correlation between 
the effects test favoring extraterritoriality and a judicial decision in favor 
of extraterritoriality: 88.46%.176 In addition, he found that Timberlane’s 
seven additional comity factors appears to be fully determinative, both 
when favoring and when disfavoring extraterritoriality.177 Trader Joe’s is 
no different from other cases in the Ninth Circuit in this regard. 
The Trader Joe’s decision is reflective of the highly dynamic nature of 
globalized and digitized business and the attendant trademark goodwill 
of U.S.-based companies. The involvement of U.S. actors and U.S. 
interests in many of these cases also suggests that extraterritorial reach 
 
173 Dodge, supra note 47, at 2078. 
174 Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270 (2010) (“While there 
is no reason to believe that the United States has become the Barbary Coast for 
those perpetrating frauds on foreign securities markets, some fear that it has become 
the Shangri–La of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly 
cheated in foreign securities markets.”). 
175 Dornis, supra note 49, at 594 (“US nationals and entities can be expected to 
crowd the defendant’s bench. . . . The majority of disputes (68.43%) featured at least 
one US national or entity on the defendant side.”). Of course, these statistics have to 
be taken with a grain of salt, as reported cases do not represent the whole universe 
of decisions. See generally McCuskey, supra note 42. 
176 Dornis, supra note 49, at 607-609 (“Among 63 [non-Timberlane test] opinions 
that found the result of the effects test to favor extraterritoriality, courts applied the 
Lanham Act 96.83% of the time.”). 
177 Id. at 607. 
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of the Lanham Act is defensible, at least when involving U.S. parties.178 
But even if that is so, it may not be consistent with trademark policy, 
which the next section considers. 
C. Combining Books and Action: The “Glocalization”179 of Trademark 
Policies 
The effects test does not produce certainty, predictability, or 
reproducibility of results. This section briefly argues a different point: The 
extraterritoriality tests are not well-calibrated to core trademark policies 
of avoiding consumer confusion or protecting legitimate business 
investment.  In tandem with a liberal effects test: (1) the anti-dilution 
theories of relief will have greater, perhaps out-sized, influence relative 
to other theories of harm based upon consumer confusion; and (2) the 
first sale doctrine will be eroded almost completely, to the detriment of 
businesses that rely on this long-standing principle of international 
exhaustion. While these trends may help certain U.S. industries, they will 
certainly harm others such as the increasing proportion of commerce 
engaged in by so-called “third party sellers.” 
Because the Trader Joe’s complaint alleged only reputational and not 
economic damage, the most plausible theory of recovery on the record 
presented before the court was anti-dilution180 of trademark goodwill—
propounded through a “quality control” exception to exhaustion. Thus, it 
is not a stretch to say that the court endorsed a transnational goodwill 
concept through its finding of “some effect” on U.S. commerce.181 Yet as 
the Supreme Court famously proclaimed in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. 
Metcalf: “the mark, of itself, cannot travel to markets where there is no 
article to wear the badge and no trader to offer the article. . . . [T]he trade-
mark right assigned . . . [cannot be] greater in extent than the trade in 
which it [is] used.”182 By enlarging the scope of transnational goodwill, 
 
178 Dornis, supra note 49, at 594 (“More concretely, 31.58% (42 out of 133) of 
cases involved only US nationals or entities as defendants, and 36.84% (49 out of 
133) involved at least one US defendant together with foreign individuals or entities. 
Only 17.29% (23 out of 133) of the disputes featured a defendant bench comprised 
solely of foreign individuals or corporations.”). 
179 Piero Bassetti, Editorial, GLOCALISM: JOURNAL OF CULTURE, POLITICS AND 
INNOVATION (2013). 
180 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
181 Cf. Morris, supra note 46, at 83-84 (“[W]hen trademark laws are 
extraterritorially applied, they in effect create some form of universal guarantee or 
global norm . . . . As a result, international intellectual property rules are increasingly 
shaped by private regulatory activities.”). 
182 240 U.S. 403, 416-17 (1916) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see 
Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that 
use within the U.S. is not a pre-requisite to an unfair competition claim based upon 
section 43(a)). 
FINAL_CHON.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/19  11:34 PM 
140 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. [Vol. 25:2 
 
the effects test becomes a proxy for global anti-dilution claims without 
statutory defenses183 or common law defenses such as exhaustion.184 
This is especially true if courts decide cases on preliminary motions, 
before defendants have a full opportunity to raise defenses.185 
Moreover, the continual erosion of the international exhaustion rule in 
trademark law through a broadened scope of exceptions has impacts on 
not just foreign, but also American, businesses. For example, as of late 
2017, more than 300,000 small and medium enterprises were vendors 
on Amazon Prime alone.186 On-line retail platforms such as Amazon, 
eBay, Etsy, and Walmart accounted for a majority of the approximately 
$1.86 trillion global web sales in 2018.187 A large percentage of sales on 
these platforms are transacted through re-sellers, colloquially known as 
third party sellers, many based in the U.S.188 
The trademark owner’s ability to engage in quality control along global 
supply chains (or “global value networks”) is a serious concern, 
particularly in the case of food, pharmaceuticals, and other items for 
 
183 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012). 
184 Cf. Brief of 25 Intellectual Property Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Kirtsaeng v. Jon Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519 (2013) (No. 11-
697) (describing common law origins of the first sale doctrine in the context of 
copyright law). 
185 It may be that the extraterritoriality issue should be raised in a preliminary 
hearing, analogous to a Markman hearing in patent law, so as to allow the court to 
consider the full range of claims and defenses on a developed evidentiary record. 
See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
186 See Pamela N. Danziger, Thinking of Selling on Amazon?: Here are the Pros 




187 See Fareeha Ali, Inforgraphic: What are the Top Online Marketplaces?, DIGITAL 
COM. 360 (Feb. 8, 2019) https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/article/infographic-
top-online-marketplaces/ [https://perma.cc/MSF5-KAMY] (“The top online 
marketplaces in the world sold $1.86 trillion in 2018. Sales on marketplace sites . . . 
accounted for 52% of global web sales in 2018, according to Internet Retailer’s 
analysis.”). 
188 Rachel Siegel, ‘Flesh and blood robots for Amazon’: They raid clearance aisles 





[https://perma.cc/25HZ-2HBZ]. See also Feng Zhu & Qihong Liu, Competing with 
complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com, STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2618, 2624 
(2018) (estimating that 40 percent of Amazon’s sales in 2013 were attributable to 
third party sellers). 
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which quality control is important to consumer health.189 However, the 
quality control exception has become a rationale for trademark owners 
to wield virtually absolute control over subsequent sales of all manner of 
goods, in defiance of the exhaustion principle’s policy against restraint of 
trade in chattel via intellectual property. As Charles Colman has 
observed: 
[T]he purported “general rule”—“that a trademark owner’s 
authorized initial sale of its product exhausts the trademark owner’s 
right to maintain control” — has now become the exception.190 
Other scholars have documented the expanding and often legitimate 
functions of trademark goodwill in global markets.191 Yet absent 
multilateral consensus about the legal treatment of goodwill, an overly-
broad application of U.S. principles via the effects test unilaterally 
imposes these U.S. perspectives and values upon the rest of the world 
through the actions of private actors able to take strategic advantage of 
different legal rules across borders. This could backfire, harming U.S. 
interests in the international sphere, if individual profit maximization 
distorts the general social welfare produced by healthy competition 
among firms. 
CONCLUSION: KONDO-ING STEELE IN LIGHT OF TRADER JOE’S 
Steele is fairly formidable precedent. It continues to impact decisions 
about the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act and it has been cited 
over 2,000 times, as befits a pioneering case involving extraterritorial 
application of U.S. laws. While its authority remains solid in many 
respects, it has an uncertain relation to more recent cases such as 
Arbaugh and Morrison, which frown on unnecessary subject matter 
jurisdictional characterizations. Furthermore, Steele’s complete reliance 
 
189 Margaret Chon, Trademark Goodwill as a Public Good: Brands and Innovations 
in Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 277, 297 (2017). 
190 Charles E. Colman, Post-Kirtsaeng, ‘Material Differences’ Between Copyright 
and Trademark Law’s Treatment of Gray Goods Persist 6 (N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal 
Theory Working Paper No. 13-40, 2013) (“[O]ne federal court after another . . . has 
added to the list of potentially “material” differences between goods for purposes of 
trademark liability, [thus] dealing in most types of gray goods has become a risky 
endeavor. The boundaries of permissible conduct are difficult to locate in the case 
law. . . .”). 
191 Graeme Dinwoodie has differentiated between social and commercial 
practices around trademark rights in common law countries, which are based on use, 
and political authority regarding trademark rights, which correlate heavily with civil 
law jurisdictions, arguing that an overly-expansive view of “use” possibly exacerbates 
the differences between common law jurisdictions (which require use) and civil law 
jurisdictions (which are registration-based). Dinwoodie, supra note 52, at 888, 913, 
918; see also Austin, supra note 29, 412-19. 
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on Section 45 of the Lanham Act arguably does not comport with the RJR 
Nabisco’s rule of “clear, affirmative indication” of Congressional intent to 
extend the Lanham Act extraterritorially. Finally, Steele’s ambiguous 
“effects test” has allowed the development of a possibly over-broad 
scope of extraterritoriality in subsequent caselaw, which flies in the face 
of the Morrison reasoning. 
The current version of the effects test seems to be a conceptual hybrid 
existing somewhere between jurisdiction and merits. It may be that the 
federal common law of extraterritoriality is simply too heterogeneous to 
fit into the current vehicles provided by the FRCP.192 Much of the 
evidence and arguments presented here suggest that the Steele 
extraterritoriality test is an issue that should be characterized as an issue 
on the merits.  If so, then as the Supreme Court did with Title VII in 
Arbaugh and the Securities and Exchange Act in Morrison, it can take 
swift action with the Lanham Act. On the other hand, if this issue is 
essentially a jurisdictional one, despite the Morrison ruling, then either 
the Court should address the new circuit split or Congress should enact 
a jurisdictional statute193 to make this jurisdictional classification clear. 
As importantly, the Court can also give greater guidance to future 
courts and parties about how to approach the discretion-laden decision 
to apply U.S. law to activities impacting U.S. commerce in this era of 
increasingly globalized trademark goodwill. It can and should “kondo”194 
the status of prescriptive jurisdictional disputes in the Lanham Act— 
instead of over-relying on federal common law with its tortuously slow 
development in the face of fast-moving commercial activities. 
 
 
192 The current situation with the law of extraterritorial jurisdiction might be 
analogized to the common law of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction prior to the 
enactment of section 1367. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012). 
193  Or perhaps, more narrowly, Congress could amend the Lanham Act to make 
clear that extraterritoriality is a jurisdictional inquiry in the specific context of 
trademark law. Id. 
194 Zimmer, supra note 1. 
